The Formation of Firms and the Prior Experience of New Entrepreneurs by Enrico Colombatto & Arie Melnik




WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 




THE FORMATION OF FIRMS AND THE PRIOR EXPERIENCE 




Working Paper No. 32/2006 
 
 
 The Formation of Firms and the Prior Experience 
Of New Entrepreneurs 
 








We use a simple model to analyze the founding stage of new firms. Our goal is to 
characterize the directional causality between the expected rewards from 
entrepreneurship and the length of prior labor market experience that entrepreneurs 
possess. We test predictions about the timing of the formation of new firms on a 
sample of Italian entrepreneurs who founded new firms in the period 1992-2004. We 
obtain three main results. First, the timing of the foundation of new firms is 
determined primarily by the expectation of higher income and not so much by the 
perception of risk. Second, earlier experience of entrepreneurs in full time 
employment has a positive impact on the size of newly founded firms. Third, when 
we separate founders who work alone from founders who work with family partners, 
we find that the latter establish and control larger firms. 
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1. Introduction  
It is widely recognized that entrepreneurs who found new firms contribute 
significantly to long-term economic growth. They also expand employment 
opportunities in the short run. Therefore, the impact of entrepreneurs (and of the start-
up firms which they establish) has been a topic of interest to economic researchers for 
a number of years. Most of the research has focused on the stage when new firms try 
to grow by raising capital from financial investors in general and venture capitalists in 
particular. Indeed, the later stages of the growth of existing small firms have been 
covered extensively in both the theoretical and empirical literature. In contrast, there 
is relatively little systematic knowledge about the emergence of new firms. So, 
questions such as “who are the individuals that are most likely to found new firms?”, 
“what types of work experience do they possess?” and “when do they leave the status 
of employees?” justify more research effort. 
Evans and Leighton (1989) noted that experience in the labor market has a 
positive influence on the probability of becoming owners of businesses that employ 
other people. Put differently, experience in the labor market, usually in the same 
industry, is a pre-requisite for entrepreneurship. This article tries to shed some light on 
the issue of conversion. That is, on when an employee decides to become an 
entrepreneur. To this effect, we use a simple model to analyze the founding stage of 
small firms with a positive number of employees
1. We then test the prediction of the 
 
                                                 
1 Self-employed workers are here ignored following Lazear (2002, 2004), who emphasizes that a 
unique feature of an entrepreneur is the ability to direct, motivate and manage other workers in the 
firm.   3
model on a sample of 178 entrepreneurs who founded new firms in the period 1992-
2004. 
The model we use considers an employee contemplating to start a new 
business. He will then weigh the costs and benefits of such a step, i.e. the expected 
increased earnings due to entrepreneurship in case of success, as well as the 
probabilities and consequences of failure. All these he/she must evaluate and weigh 
against the alternative of keeping the status of an employee
2.  
The two main questions that we address are the length of the previous work 
experience of new entrepreneurs and the factors that motivate them to establish new 
firms. Our main results can be summarized as follows: First, the timing of the 
foundation of new firms is determined primarily by the expectations of higher income 
and not so much by the perception of risk. Second, the entrepreneurs’ previous 
personal experience as owners-managers has a statistically significant impact on the 
size of the firms which they found. Third, when we differentiate founders that work 
alone from founders that work with family partners we find that the latter establish 
and control larger firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
provide a review of the literature on the establishment and growth of new firms and 
the conditions they need in order to flourish. In section 3 we use a simple model to 
investigate the determinants of the level of prior experience that entrepreneurs build 
up before they open a new business. The model is tested using a sample of recently 
established new businesses in Italy; Section 4 contains a detailed description of the 
data. In section 5 we present the results. Section 6 adds information about the size of 
newly founded firms. Section 7 concludes.   
 
                                                 
2 In a multi-period model the individual should consider not only the benefits accruing directly from 
switching to the status of an owner of business. He/she should also consider the value of the option of 
expanding the size of the firm by taking on new partners. The benefits of continuing to expand the firm 
and of going public are not considered here.   4
2. Literature review  
In the traditional theoretical literature about the formation of new firms the 
entrepreneur is assumed to exist and to be endowed with a good business sense. He 
conceives an idea for a new product or holds the key to a newly discovered market 
and looks for funding that is provided by outside investors. This setup has been 
described in the pioneering articles of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Rosen (1982) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1998). The theoretical literature, such as Aghion and Tirole 
(1994), also considers how new ventures should grow and how innovations should be 
managed. Rajan and Zingales (2001) even discuss the optimal organization format of 
firms where the founding owner controls some “critical resources” and the 
environment features imperfect property rights. The relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the outside investor, who is the focus of most of these models, is 
characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. The sources of 
the inside knowledge of the entrepreneur who runs the firm are generally ignored. 
Additional traits of the entrepreneurs have been investigated in the empirical 
literature on family firms, where the importance of family control is well documented. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) noted that family control is 
more common in countries with lower shareholders’ protection rights. Faccio and 
Lang (2002) added that 44 percent of Western European firms are family controlled
3. 
Most of the research on family business focused on problems related to existing firms. 
For example, Zingales (1995) predicts that families will either keep control or sell 
their controlling stakes and exit. Similarly, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001) claim 
that market imperfections are important drivers in the decision of family owners to 
bequeath their shares to the next generation or to sell their controlling stake and 
bequeath the proceeds.    
In analyzing the long-term consequences of family ownership, the 
concentration of wealth is also an issue. Specifically, the question is what motivates 
families to concentrate most of their wealth in one firm? The impact of family 
 
                                                 
3 Of course, this is an average figure around which there is a significant variation. For example, Faccio 
and Lang (2002) report that in France and in Germany 65 percent of the firms are family-controlled. In 
Italy 60 percent of the firms are controlled by family. In contrast, the comparable number in the UK is 
24 percent.    5
ownership on the performance of publicly registered companies also received 
considerable attention
4. 
Another strand of the literature that deals with the origins of entrepreneurship 
provides insights about the desirable qualities and constraints. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 
(2000) find that individuals build human capital by learning from their self-employed 
parents. Intergenerational links provide not only physical capital but also human 
capital to new owners of new firms. Evans and Leighton (1989) show that the 
availability and type of financial contracts affect the individual decision on whether to 
become an entrepreneur.  
The aspirations of entrepreneurs, their personalities and psychological 
backgrounds are well documented by a number of experiments and surveys
5. This 
literature also investigates the effect of pressure, of the perceived stigma of failure and 
the sense of optimism that entrepreneurs are expected to possess. Recently some 
authors also began to examine the process by which the entrepreneur gains the 
necessary qualifications needed to create a start-up firm. Lazear (2002) finds that 
successful entrepreneurs possess knowledge in a portfolio of activities, that they are 
generalists rather than specialists, and that those endowed with a more balanced 
human capital enjoy a distinct advantage
6. In short, the prior background of the 
entrepreneur is indeed important. Our paper complements Lazear’s findings by 
focusing on the determinants of the length of experience prior to opening a business 
for the first time.  
 
 
                                                 
4 For example, McConaughy, Matthews and Fialco (2001), find that traded family firms have greater 
market value and carry less debt than non-family firms in the US. However, family firms become less 
profitable than other firms when controlled by the second and third generations. In contrast, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) find that family firms in the US do create value when the founder or the next 
descendants are active as CEOs. 
5 See for example Davidsson and Honig (2003), Reynolds (1997), Shane (2000), De Meza and Southey 
(1996), Blau (1987). 
6 The idea that the entrepreneurs possess several skills was already noted by Baumol (1990). He shows 
that entrepreneurs can play several roles – productive and unproductive. He does not consider, 
however, the ways of acquiring the capabilities that a person needs in order to become a practicing 
entrepreneur.   6
3.  The Best Time to Start a New Firm 
In order to evaluate whether to found a new firm one compares the possibility of 
starting a new venture with the alternative of remaining an employee, say, in an 
existing family firm
7. Suppose that an individual spends n years as an employee and 
that N>n is his time horizon, such as the working life. n is determined by risk 
aversion, expected income and expenditure flows from present and future 
occupations. Environmental factors – say support by the family and the community, 
government policy towards business ownership – are also likely to play a role.  
Variable n is the decision variable in the present analysis. It may be influenced 
also by the age of the individual, by the nature of the industry and by the cyclicality of 
the economy. Personal income from business ownership is Xt per period, while Pt 
defines the probability of success in any given year and (1 – Pt) the probability of 
business failure. As noted, the alternative to the act of founding a new business is to 
remain an employee and earn Rt per period. The present value from remaining as an 
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where F is the cost of closure that has to be paid if an event of business failure occurs.  
The business owner (entrepreneur) wants to maximize the difference between 
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7 This is similar to the classical question of the literature about the formation of new households: when 
do children leave their parents’ home and go on to found a new household? On this issue wide variation 
is observed across countries and Italy is different from most other countries.    7
where F is the penalty cost of closure and N is the exogenous time limit (e.g. time to 
mandatory retirement).  
We can assume some reasonable values for the parameters and try to calculate 
















: as the X/R ratio (or the X-R difference) increases, n becomes smaller. 
Put differently, higher income from ownership relative to income from the present 
employment encourages the potential entrepreneur to stay a shorter time as an 
employee and switch faster to ownership status. 









.  This is a positive 
monotonic function: as the ratio F/R increases, the cost of failure relative to the salary 
of an employee is larger. As a result we would expect him/her to stay longer as an 
employee. 
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means that as the 
probability of failure increases, the person would like to stay longer as an employee.  
 
In short, we expect that  
•  as the ratio of income from entrepreneurship increases relative to that 
from being an employee, the worker spends less time as an employee.  
•  if the individual is not too much of a risk lover, as the probability of 
failure increases, the attractiveness of entrepreneurship declines and 
the individual will spend more time as an employee.  
•  as the cost of business failure increases, the individual will stay 
longer as an employee.   8
4. Description of the data 
 
General 
We plan to test these propositions by using a detailed sample based on a 2005 survey 
of newly formed firms in Northern Italy. Compared to other countries, Italy exhibits 
the largest share of working population that is categorized as self-employed or as 
business owners. In addition, the number of newly formed small businesses stays 
stable over time
8. The dataset on entrepreneurs we use has two advantages compared 
to other datasets. First, it contains information about the number of years of work both 
before and after becoming an entrepreneur. Second, it includes an easy to understand, 
and to quantify, measure of monetary payoff. Therefore, we can compare personal 
earnings of entrepreneurs just before they left their last job with their present earnings 
as owner-managers.  
Our survey was conducted by using the major existing source of information 
on the demography of Italian firms – the Business Register known as “Registro delle 
Imprese”. The Register is maintained by the provincial Chambers of Commerce. It 
lists all existing firms by legal form and includes some information about the owners. 
During the second half of 2005 we gathered information about a sample of small 
registered firms born in the regions of Lombardia, Piemonte and Veneto. The sample 
was selected using the following procedure. First, we considered 828 new firms that 
entered the registration rosters between 1992 and 2004
9. Second, a sample of 286 
firms was selected from the group of firms that had at least 5 employees in 2004 if 
 
                                                 
8 Earlier researchers offered some explanations to this unique Italian phenomenon. For example, Sestito 
(1989) mentioned the diminishing role of scale economies (and the increasing role of non-standardized 
production). A second reason is the advantages in tax reduction (not to mention even outright evasion) 
that accrue to autonomous workers and entrepreneurs. Rapiti (1997) added the relative advantage of 
small firms in managing turbulent industrial relations. Surely, all the above may not be reasons that are 
strictly unique to Italy. However, reasons that exist in other countries are likely operate in a stronger 
way in Italy.  
9 We use a simple definition of birth. Each new firm is assumed to register and when its name is added 
to the list we call it a new firm. Closures and suspensions of activities have to be declared within a 
specified period and then such firms are de-listed. In some cases, delisting occurs due to bankruptcy or 
liquidation. In some other cases delisting may occur because of legal transformation of ownership. 
When so, the legal “death” of the firm does not mean that it stopped operations in the economic sense 
as it will be re-entered as a new firm or be integrated into another already active company.  
   9
they belonged to the service or construction sectors and at least 10 employees if they 
were industrial firms. Third, the firms were contacted and the owner-manager was 
asked to answer a few questions about his/her “conversion” from an employee to a 
business owner. The questions (English translation) that are of particular interest here 
are listed in Appendix 1. The survey covers 178 entrepreneurs, whose main 
characteristics are reported in Table 1.  
A few notes of explanation are needed before we move on. The survey data 
does cover more than adequately the question which is of interest in this paper. At the 
same time, however, they suffer from a few disadvantages. First, we cannot be sure 
that the respondents understood all the questions and if they did, that they answered 
all of them truthfully. Second, we cannot eliminate the traditional non-response bias. 
The answers of those who responded may not be representative of the views of the 
general population. Finally the information that we have is prone to the survivorship 
bias, since we use only information regarding the firms that existed in 2005. Firms 
that opened in the 1992-2004 period but closed before 2005 were ignored.  
 
Measurement of the variables  
The definition of income in our sample merits attention. As is customary in Italy, 
income includes only the gross salary subject to income tax. It excludes payments that 
are transferred directly from the company to the social security administration. 
Generally speaking, the order of magnitude of the gross wage (as well as the earnings 
of entrepreneurs) that we encounter in the sample is very different from what reported 
in the national statistics (see Istat 2000, table 3.13). The difference is probably due to 
the difference in the original subgroups. Entrepreneurs tend to be successful 
individuals even at the time when they were employees. As a result, their income was 
higher than the average income of the population.   
For the risk variable we use the actual rate of failure (in the given industry) of 
firms with five or more workers. The presumption here is that the average failure rate 
is known to those who plan to found new firms and thus is a good proxy for risk. 
The next variable is effort, which we approximate by the number of weekly 
hours of work. It is not entirely clear, however, that longer hours always reduce   10
personal utility. Many entrepreneurs emphasize with pride that they work more hours 
than they used to.  
We have two variables that measure experience. The first is the number of 
years during which the person has been working full time as an employee before 
switching. The numbers were rounded up or down in the usual way. A second 
variable is the number of years since the company was registered and started to 
operate.  
In addition we record information about the size of the firm by considering the 
number of employees. Reports on the number of employees are deemed to be more 
accurate than financial measures such as sales or size of assets (as defined in the 
financial statements). We also have partial information about the level of education of 
our respondents. Education is a 0-1 variable. If the person had a university degree it 
was recorded as one and zero otherwise. Unfortunately, many of the respondents did 
not answer this question. 
Our definition of industry is somewhat different from the one used by Istat 
(the Italian Central Statistical Office). Manufacturing and construction are generally 
defined in the same way, but subgroups of the service sector were defined differently 
because the number of entries into each cell was too low. For example, shipping, 
packaging and transportation were grouped together. Similarly, all personal services 
to families such as educational services, health and beauty were also grouped 
together. As a result, we ended with eight different industry groups: Manufacturing; 
Construction (including real estate); Business services (such as maintenance, cleaning 
etc.); Hospitality (e.g. lodging, catering and restaurants); Commerce (retail trades in 
products such as furniture, clothing, durable goods and electronics); Personal services 
(gardening, education, health beauty, house repairs); Transportation (shipping, 
packing and storage) and Miscellaneous services.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
As noted, an individual entrepreneur is included in the sample if he satisfies four 
criteria: (1) his annual income data are reported from both the present occupation as 
manager-owner, and also from the last job as an employee; (2) he founded a new firm, 
registered in Northern Italy, in the period 1992–2004; (3) this is the first start-up firm   11
he founded; (4) the size of the firm is reported. In the service sector a minimum size 
of five workers or more (in addition to the owner) is required; for the other industries 
the minimum size is ten employees. 
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the surveyed entrepreneurs. On average 
the respondents had experienced eight years as full time employees before they started 
their own business
10 and had gone through some seven years as entrepreneurs. Their 
mean present income was 57,570 €, while mean income in their last year as 
employees was close to 39,500 €.    
It is worth noting that many entrepreneurs struggle in the first few years of 
their venture. Owners as other individuals usually have other sources of income such 
as interest, dividends or rents. We do not have information about such components. 
We also do not have information on perks related to the use of company car for 
private purposes. In terms of reported income we noted that for the first two or three 
years following the establishment of the new firm their income was not much higher 
than the income as employees. As expected the surveyed entrepreneurs worked 
considerably more hours than the prescribed average of 36 hours per week that is 
common for employees in Italy.    
 
5. Empirical results 
We start by investigating the determinants of the length of previous work experience 
of our respondents (variable n). Following the prediction of the choice model 
described in section 3., we represent the length of experience prior to becoming an 
entrepreneur as a function of the income in the two competing occupations. An 
alternative specification maintains that n is a function of the difference between the 
two income streams and a third one uses the ratio of present to past income as an 
explanatory variable
11. The results are presented in the first rows of Table 2, where 
 
                                                 
10 This finding is consistent with other studies such as Blau (1987) and Hamilton (2000). 
11 Income from entrepreneurship refers to the last year of activity as entrepreneurs, which is likely to be 
higher than the income earned at the time of switching. Indeed, some studies including Hamilton 
(2000) and Lazear (2002) show that earnings at the switching year entrepreneurs are lower than those  
before the switch. This is due to switching costs and the need to begin operations at an output that is 
below minimum average cost. Our respondents may have experienced the same phenomenon, for the 
data show that in the first two years after switching income form entrepreneurship is rather low.    12
the income variables always appear to be highly significant (and with the signs 
suggested in section 3.) in determining the length of experience prior to switching. 
That is, as the difference between income from entrepreneurship and income as an 
employee increases there is a tendency to reduce the number of ‘waiting years’. 
As regards risk, the coefficient of that variable turns out to be negative, but not 
significant. There are two possible explanations for this. First, the willingness to 
assume risk is a major trait of entrepreneurs. In fact, the tendency to take on risk 
affects the decision to become an entrepreneur in the first place, so that the elements 
of the sample we are consider are by definition selected by discarding those who do 
not like taking risks
12. Furthermore, the so-called ‘competence’ effect
13 may be at 
work: When people feel that they are particularly knowledgeable in a given subject 
they tend to rely on their own judgement rather than on statistically generated 
evidence. The competence effect is particularly relevant to the behaviour of would-be 
entrepreneurs. By and large these are people with years of experience in business. 
They have vast knowledge of the industry in which they operate. In particular, their 
long training makes them feel more competent than others and more inclined to rely 
on their own subjective probabilities
14. Hence, they are more willing to act on their 
own interpretation of reality
15. Our empirical results are consistent with this 
hypothesis. 
Effort is measured by the variable named ‘Hours’, i.e. the average number of 
hours worked by owners of new firms each week. Its positive coefficient suggests that 
the prospect of working long hours might keep individuals longer in the status of 
employees (the coefficients in equations 1, 3 and 5 are not significantly different from 
 
                                                 
12 Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) noted that entrepreneurs are usually less risk averse than the general 
working population.  
13 See Heath and Tversky (1991) and Camerer and Weber (1992) 
14 The feeling of competence relies on a self-perceived expertise (or skill) and not necessarily on the 
true level of skill. The behavioral finance literature on the frequency of trading in the stock market 
recognized this. Accordingly, it defines overconfidence as an overestimation of the personal ability to 
process financial information (about the value of financial assets). See Odean (1998) and Gervais and 
Odean (2001).  
15 A similar view is also maintained by Mahajan (1992), who attributed failures to the overconfidence 
that developers of new products bring to their decision. And by Schnaars (1988), who argued that 
developers of new products tend to discount information that does not support their view about the 
possible success of their efforts.    13
zero). Perhaps “hours of work” is a poor proxy, or the expected effort associated with 
ownership is not a major determinant of the decision to open a new business. 
It could be argued that since entrepreneurs work longer hours each week, their 
income should be scaled down to reflect this fact. In Table 3 we rerun the same 
equations as in table 2 with the income measure adjusted to reflect the hours of work. 
Not surprisingly, the main results do not change much. The numerical values of the 
income coefficients change somewhat, but the directions of influence on the decision 
to become and owner stay the same. However, after scaling the coefficient on ‘Hours’ 
becomes significant.   
 
6. Determinants of size 
Of course, when considering to start a new business, prospective entrepreneurs face a 
number of decisions, apart from choosing whether to abandon their employee status. 
A major questions regards company size. Our data may help to shed some light on 
this choice.  
In particular, personal experience as an entrepreneur and the potential  to run 
large-size companies
16 have been taken into account. We also include the number of 
owners in each firm, which de facto describes family involvement. It is very common 
for families, in business, to help a younger family member to strike it on his/her own. 
In that case it is a routine practice to record another family member (and sometimes 
two members) as a co-owner. 
Table 4 reports the OLS estimates, where size is measured by the number of 
employees. The results indicate that the quality of personal experience as an employee 
matters (see variable R), that size also depends on the entrepreneur’s experience as 
such, and that family support plays a relevant role should owners-managers opt to 
expand their operations. 
 
                                                 
16 We measure such potential by referring to the last salary as an employee (i.e. before becoming an 
owner). It enters the regressions in logarithmic form. Two lines of reasoning may justify to salary as an 
employee as a proxy for potential. People with higher wage rates when employed are usually people 
with higher organizational skills, and therefore with a comparative advantage in running large-size 
companies after switching. Italy presents unusually low social mobility, so that relatively high-paid 
jobs tend to go children originating from relatively affluent families. When these highly-paid ‘children’ 
become entrepreneurs, their families are better positioned to support large family companies.    14
 
7. Summary and conclusions  
Understanding the determinants of entrepreneurship is important because of the key 
roles entrepreneurs play in any economy. This paper started from the observation that 
entrepreneurs are experienced workers who take advantage of start-up opportunities. 
Indeed, on average it takes the entrepreneurs considered in our sample some 8 years to 
abandon their status as an employee. This length of time seems to depend on a 
number of variables that affect each case in non systematic ways (family and 
environmental features, individual psychological factors). That explains the relatively 
poor explanatory power of the regression presented here. Rather surprisingly, the only 
variable that seems to have a small but regular influence on the decision to switch is 
the income gap, i.e. the difference between what the individual made as an employee 
and what he expects to make as an entrepreneur. For instance, the average owner in 
our sample declares an income gap of some € 18,000: a 10% increase in such a gap 
would lead to anticipating the switch by about a month. On the other hand, the risk of 
failure does not seem to deter potential entrepreneurs from starting their own 
company; nor does the prospect of harder work.  
Furthermore, ‘potential’, experience and family assistance are all elements  
that help to understand the size of new businesses. Much works in this direction 
deserves to be done, though. In fact, far from being conclusive, this study aims at 
opening a number of promising research prospects. Choosing to switch and become a 
small entrepreneur is a complex process. Not surprisingly, it depends on expected 
income flows; still, this study has shown that income gaps play a relatively small role, 
and that neither risk, nor expected working efforts are likely to be very relevant. Other 
elements need to be investigated, possibly by means of cross country analysis, so as to 
capture the role of effective and institutional variables – tax incentives and loopholes, 
the rule of law, the ethics of capitalism. This paper does not have the ambition to 
provide clear insights in this direction. Still, it shows that the explanatory power of the 
variables that are traditionally taken into account by mainstream economics might 
turn out to be rather disappointing, and that other, possibly interdisciplinary 
approaches could be more encouraging.    15
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
N valid 
obs  Mean  Median  Std. 
Deviation  Min   Max  
# owners   171  1.47  1  0.75  1  4 
Starting income (euro)  39  22696.97  22000  5721.32  11689  40000 
Last income as employee (R)  170  39507.30  38550  9222.97  19600  68000 
New income as employer (X)   175  57569.52  49000  25851.02  13400  153000 
Years as an employee (y1)   173  8.35  8  3.47  1  16 
Years as an entrepreneur (y2)  178  6.66  6  3.72  1  20 
Education (dummy)  84  0.54  1  0.50  0  1 
Hours (weekly)  161  52.24  52  7.82  30  70 
Number of employees   177  14.38  10  12.29  5  75 
Age   175  45.67  49.5  11.53  29.5  69.5 
Income stability (dummy)   86  0.58  1  0.50  0  1 
 
 
Starting Income is the income from the first job (paid employment) following entry into the 
labour force. Earlier lira data were converted into euro at the conversion exchange rate of 
1936.27 lire/euro. 
Last income as an employee (R) is the annual gross personal income as an employee 
expressed in euro. Earlier lira data were converted into euro at the conversion exchange rate 
of 1936.27 lire/euro. 
New income as an employer (X) is the recent, 2004, annual income from ownership of the 
business. Ownership income includes management compensation. 
Years as an employee (Y1) are the number of years that the manager/owner spent as an 
employee (in the public or in the private sector) before establishing the present firm. 
Years as an entrepreneur (Y2) are the number of years of ownership/operation of the 
present firm. 
Education is a dummy variable which takes on 1 if the founder holds a university degree and 
0 otherwise. 
Hours is the number of hours worked per week by the owner/manager. 
Number of employees is the number of salaried (non family) employees in the firm at the 
beginning of 2005. 
Age is the present age of the owner/manager. 
Income stability is a dummy variable. It answers to the question “How stable is your annual 
income over time”. The answer was recorded as a dichotomous variable: 1 for stable income 
and zero for unstable.   16
Table 2 – Determinants of previous experience (n, measured in years) 
















Log R  7.586 
(5.94) 
6.583 
(4.98)         
Log X  -7.500 
(-7.56) 
-5.566 
(-5.46)         




   




















Hours   0.052 
(1.26) 
  0.060 
(1.5) 
  0.029 
(0.74) 
 
Years entrepr    -0.193 
(-1.87)    -0.109 




Education               0.305 
(0.45) 
R
2  0.387  0.415  0.434  0.408  0.365  0.391  0.394 
Adjusted R
2   0.369  0.400  0.419  0.394  0.351  0.379  0.359 
Obs   144  159  120  132  144  159  74 
 
Note: the numbers in parenthesis, below the coefficient are the t values 
 
R is the last annual gross personal income as an employee in euro. Earlier lire data were 
converted into euro at the conversion exchange rate of 1936,27 lire/euro.  
X is the most recent year (usually 2004) annual income from ownership of the business. 
Earlier lira data were converted into euro at the conversion exchange rate of 1936,27 lire/euro.  
Risk denotes the actual failure rate of new businesses in Piemonte, Lombardia and Veneto 
with more than 5 employees that failed in the year preceding the establishment of the new 
firm. 
Hours is the number of weekly hours worked as an entrepreneur        
Years as an entrepreneur is the number of years of ownership/operation of present firm.  
Education is a dummy variable: 1 if he/she holds a university degree, 0 if not.    17
Table 3 – Determinants of previous experience, income variables are weighted by 
the number of hours of work per week (dependent variable: years as employee) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Constant  4.461  15.510  23.246  22.832  10.013  15.222  15.012 
  (0.56)  (2.07)  (8.71)  (8.39)  (4.12)  (11.89)  (7.49) 
Log R  7.354  2.981           
  (5.8)  (2.86)           
Log X  -7.483  -3.233           
  (-7.47)  (-3.66)           
Log (X – R)      -2.985  -1.724       
      (-7.02)  (-3.87)       
X/R          -3.141  -1.545  -1.560 
          (-6.89)  (-3.76)  (-2.35) 
Risk   -0.228  -0.369  -0.328  -0.404  -0.362  -0.402  -0.348 
  (-1.09)  (-1.76)  (-1.52)  (-1.91)  (-1.72)  (-1.92)  (-1.05) 
Hours  0.198    0.103    0.123     
  (3.59)    (2.02)    (2.44)     
Years entrepr    -0.268    -0.256    -0.276  -0.304 
    (-2.33)    (-2.15)    (-2.36)  (-1.64) 
Education              0.119 
              (0.16) 
R
2  0.381  0.349  0.340  0.343  0.343  0.341  0.325 
Adjust R
2  0.363  0.330  0.324  0.327  0.329  0.327  0.280 
Obs  144  144  127  127  144  144  65 
Note: the numbers in parenthesis, below the coefficient, are the t values 
 
R is the last annual gross personal income as an employee in euro. Earlier lira data were 
converted to euro at the conversion exchange rate of 1936,27 lire/euro.  
X is the most recent year (usually 2004) annual income from ownership of the business. 
Earlier lire data was converted to euro at the conversion exchange rate of 1936,27 lire/euro.  
Risk denotes the actual failure rate of new businesses in Piemonte, Lombardia and Veneto 
with more than 5 employees that failed in the year preceding the establishment of the new 
firm. 
Hours is the number of weekly hours worked as an entrepreneur        
Years as an entrepreneur  is the number of years of ownership/operation of present firm.  
Education is a dummy variable : 1 if he/she holds university degree, 0 if not.    18
Table 4 – Determinants of size 
 
Panel A – Dependent variable: number of employees 
   Equation 
  1  2  3  4 
Constant   -200.727  -173.777  -188.121  -160.191 
  (-6.18)  (-5.54)  (-5.69)  (-5.04) 
Log R  19.276  16.177  18.613  15.336 
  (6.27)  (5.4)  (5.94)  (5.05) 
Years entrepreneur   1.795  1.632     
  (8.66)  (7.98)     
Years entrep squared      0.112  0.102 
      (8.14)  (7.55) 
# owners    4.777    5.022 
    (4.9)    (5.1) 
R
2  0.415  0.506  0.394  0.491 
Adjusted R
2  0.408  0.496  0.386  0.481 
Obs  168  161  168  161 
 
 
Panel B – Dependent variable: logarithm of number of employees 
  Equation 
  1  2  3  4 
Constant   -7.120  -5.122  -6.383  -4.323 
  (-4.3)  (-3.37)  (-3.68)  (-2.72) 
Log R  0.839  0.614  0.803  0.565 
  (5.35)  (4.24)  (4.88)  (3.73) 
Years entrepreneur   0.108  0.095     
  (10.19)  (9.62)     
Years entrepr squared      0.006  0.006 
      (8.95)  (8.39) 
# owners    0.316    0.335 
    (6.71)    (6.82) 
R
2  0.451  0.580  0.397  0.539 
Adjusted R
2  0.444  0.572  0.390  0.530 
Obs  168  161  168  161 
 
Note: the numbers in parenthesis, below the coefficient, are the t values 
 
R is the last annual gross personal income as an employee in euro. Earlier lira data were 
converted into euro at the conversion exchange rate of 1936, 27 lire/euro. 
Years as an entrepreneur are the number of years of ownership/operation of present firm.  
# Owners is the number of firm owners as registered in the documents of incorporation.   19
Appendix 1: An English translation of the questionnaire  
  
LIST OF QUESTIONS REGARDING ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ITALY 
 
 
1.  Age group           _____     _____     _____     ____      _____ 
  25-34     35-44     45-54     55-64      65-74 
 
2.  Industry classification is ______________________________________ 
 
3.  Size of firm: number of employees ____________ 
 
4.  Personal annual income from ownership of the business ________ € 
 
5.  Last annual income as an employee _________ € 
 
6.  Last job/position before opening your business ___________________ 
 
7.  How many years you spent as an employee ____________________ 
 
8.  How many years do you own/operate your firm ________________ 
 
9.  Do you have a university degree? _________    ___________ 
Yes          No 
10.  How many hours a week do you work now  _______________ 
 
11.  How stable is your annual income over time  ________       _______     
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